The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life — Context and Discussion
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plished. From that moment he ceased to be a factor necessary to the religious life. The practice of the four holy truths would be possible, even if the memory of him who revealed them were completely obliterated.[52] It is quite another matter with Christianity, which is inconceivable without the ever-present idea of Christ and his ever-practised cult; for it is by the ever-living Christ, sacrificed each day, that the community of believers continues to communicate with the supreme source of the spiritual life.[53]
All that precedes can be applied equally well to another great religion of India, Jaïnism. The two doctrines have nearly the same conception of the world and of life. "Like the Buddhists," says Barth, "the Jaïnas are atheists. They admit of no creator; the world is eternal; they explicitly deny the possibility of a perfect being from the beginning. The Jina became perfect; he was not always so."
Just as the Buddhists in the north, the Jaïnists, or at least certain of them, have come back to a sort of deism; in the inscriptions of Dekhan there is mention of a _Jinapati_, a sort of supreme Jina, who is called the primary creator; but such language, says the same author, is "in contradiction to the most explicit declarations extracted from their most authorized writings."[54]
Moreover, if this indifference for the divine is developed to such a point in Buddhism and Jaïnism, it is because its germ existed already in the Brahmanism from which the two were derived. In certain of its forms at least, Brahmic speculation ended in "a frankly materialistic and atheistic interpretation of the universe."[55] In time, the numerous divinities which the people of India had originally learned to adore, came to merge themselves into a sort of principal deity, impersonal and abstract, the essence of all that exists. This supreme reality, which no longer has anything of a divine personality about it, is contained within man himself, or rather, man is but one with it, for nothing exists apart from it. To find it, and unite himself to it, one does not have to search some external support outside himself; it is enough to concentrate upon himself and meditate. "If in Buddhism," says Oldenberg, "the proud attempt be made to conceive a deliverance in which man himself delivers himself, to create a faith without a god, it is Brahmanical speculation which has prepared the way for this thought. It thrusts back the idea of a god step by step; the forms of the old gods have faded away, and besides the Brahma, which is enthroned in its everlasting quietude, highly exalted above the destinies of the human world, there is left remaining, as the sole really active person in the great work of deliverance, man himself."[56] Here, then, we find a considerable portion of religious evolution which has consisted in the progressive recoil of the idea of a spiritual being from that of a deity. Here are great religions where invocations, propitiations, sacrifices and prayers properly so-called are far from holding a preponderating place, and which consequently do not present that distinctive sign by which some claim to recognize those manifestations which are properly called religious.
But even within deistic religions there are many rites which are completely independent of all idea of gods or spiritual beings. In the first place, there are a multitude of interdictions. For example, the Bible orders that a woman live isolated during a determined period each month;[57] a similar isolation is obligatory during the lying-in at child-birth;[58] it is forbidden to hitch an ass and a horse together, or to wear a garment in which the hemp is mixed with flax;[59] but it is impossible to see the part which belief in Jahveh can have played in these interdictions, for he is wholly absent from all the relations thus forbidden, and could not be interested in them. As much can be said for the majority of the dietetic regulations. These prohibitions are not peculiar to the Hebrews, but they are found under diverse forms, but with substantially the same character, in innumerable religions.
Durkheim opens by stating his dual aim: to analyze the simplest known religion (Australian totemism) and to trace the social origins of fundamental categories of thought. He immediately distinguishes his approach from prior theories, rejecting definitions based on the supernatural or a supreme deity. Instead, he proposes a positive definition: religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things—things set apart and forbidden—that unite adherents into a single moral community called a Church.
This definition is not merely taxonomic; it frames his entire investigation. By insisting that the sacred/profane dichotomy is the hallmark of religious thought, Durkheim sets the stage for his later argument that religion is eminently social. The excerpts show him carefully building this foundation before turning to ethnographic evidence.
Defining Religion Without God or Mystery
In the first chapter, Durkheim systematically eliminates two common definitions: religion as belief in the supernatural and religion as belief in a god or spiritual being. He argues that the notion of mystery is not primitive—early peoples do not see the world as mysterious—and that there exist religions without gods, such as Buddhism and Jainism. His positive definition hinges on the division of the world into sacred and profane, a dichotomy that is absolute and irreducible. Rites are rules of conduct that prescribe how one must behave toward sacred things. This definition allows him to include totemism, which lacks personalized deities, as a genuine religion.
Critique of Animism and the Soul
Durkheim then turns to animism, the theory that religion originates from the idea of the soul. He dissects its three theses: the genesis of the soul idea from dreams, the transformation of souls into spirits after death, and the evolution of spirit cults into nature worship. He rejects each. Dreams, he contends, cannot account for the soul's duality and immortality; death does not automatically turn a soul into a spirit requiring cult; and the evidence from Australian tribes shows that ancestor worship is not primitive. His critique is meticulous, citing ethnographic reports to undermine the evolutionary schema of Tylor and Spencer.
Supreme Gods in Australia: A Test Case
In a later excerpt, Durkheim examines the presence of high gods like Bunjil and Baiame among Australian tribes. He notes that these beings are often represented by images, addressed in prayers, and associated with initiation rites. Their authority extends beyond single tribes, giving their cult an international character. Durkheim uses this evidence to challenge both Tylor's dismissal of these gods as European imports and Andrew Lang's claim that they represent a primitive monotheism superimposed on totemism. Instead, he suggests that such gods are not anomalous but part of a coherent social logic, though the excerpts leave his full resolution unclear.
Structure and Argumentative Strategy
The book's structure is revealed in the table of contents: an introduction on method, a book of preliminary questions (definition, critique of animism and naturism), and subsequent books on totemic beliefs and rituals. Durkheim's argument proceeds by negation—clearing away rival theories—before constructing his positive thesis. The excerpts show his reliance on ethnographic detail, often from Australian sources, and his habit of framing debates with named opponents (Tylor, Lang, Spencer). Readers should note how he uses negative evidence: a theory is refuted not by counterexample alone but by showing it fails to account for the simplest known religion.
Durkheim's work is best approached as a sustained argument, not an encyclopedia of primitive religion. The excerpts reveal a thinker who defines his terms sharply, engages critically with predecessors, and uses ethnographic data to test sociological hypotheses. Readers unfamiliar with Australian ethnography may benefit from a map of tribal regions and a glossary of totemic terms. Pay attention to how Durkheim moves from definition to critique to positive construction—this logical arc is the book's backbone.
That rainy afternoon, Durkheim’s maps of Aboriginal sacred geographies blurred into human names for holy places. I kept wondering where Bethlehem actually sat on a modern road. Later, dusting a shelf, my hand found Names and places in the Old and New Testament and Apocrypha, with their modern identifications — A Reader’s Guide, and the ancient text suddenly felt closer to home, less abstract, more like weather on familiar ground.
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